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Settlement of the Namibian Dispute:
The United States Role in Lieu of U.N. Sanctions
by Deneice C. Jordan-Walker*
I. INTRODUCTION
T he Namibian conflict is best viewed as a dispute primarily between
the United Nations and South Africa over the legal propriety of
South Africa's presence in Namibia (South West Africa),1 and the terms
under which South Africa will relinquish de facto control of the territory.2
On January 7, 1982, the new U.N. Secretary General, Javier Prez de
Cu6llar, declared resolution of the Namibian conflict a major objective of
the United Nations.3 Secretary General DeCueller's statement is an ac-
knowledgement that peaceful settlement of the issue of Namibia's inde-
pendence is crucial to the reputation and integrity of the United Nations
as the leading international organization which strives to prevent war,4
* J.D. Candidate, Case Western Reserve University School of Law (1983).
1 Namibia (South West Africa) is located on the Atlantic coast of Africa and is bor-
dered by South Africa to the south and east. 9 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA Micropedia 384
(15th ed. 1977). On June 12, 1968, South West Africa was renamed Namibia by the U.N.
General Assembly "in accordance with the desires of its people." See G.A. Res. 2372, 2 U.N.
GAOR Supp. (No. 16A) at 1, U.N. Doc. A/6716 (1968). Consequently, this note will use
"South West Africa" when discussing issues which arose prior to June 12, 1968 and
"Namibia" for issues arising after that date. For a similar approach, see I. SAGAY, THE LE-
GAL ASPECTS OF THE NAmmiAN DIsPUTE at xxx-xxxi (1975).
2 On December 17, 1920, South West Africa, a German colony from 1883 to 1919, came
under the direct administration of South Africa as a League of Nations Mandate. In 1966,
twenty years after the dissolution of the League of Nations, the United Nations revoked
South Africa's administration of South West Africa for breach of its administrative obliga-
tions. Thereafter, the United Nations assumed legal responsibility for administering South
West Africa. The legality of the U.N. position and the illegality of South Africa's presence in
Namibia was confirmed by the International Court of Justice in 1971. Nevertheless, the
South African government refuses to withdraw from Namibia. See generally, I. SAGAY,
supra note 1; S. SLONIM, SouTH WEST AFRICA AND THE UNITED NATIONS: AN INTERNATIONAL
MANDATE IN DisPruE (1973).
1 N.Y. Times, Jan. 8, 1982, at A5, col. 3.
4 The Namibian conflict constitutes a fundamental test of the U.N.'s capability to fulfill
its primary purpose of maintaining international peace and security since the conflict could
conceiveably develop into open warfare between South African troops and Cuban or other
Soviet bloc troops. See, e.g., Jackson, Reagan's Policy Rupture, AFRICA REP., Sept.-Oct.
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advance human rights,5 and administer territories to self-government or
independence.6
The quest for a peaceful and internationally acceptable plan to settle
the Namibian dispute also plagues the U.S. led Western negotiating
group.7 The United States' concern with southern Africa stems from its
recognition of the region's economic and strategic importance."
This note will propose, as an alternative to U.N. oil and trade sanc-
tions against South Africa, an approach by which the United States can
expedite the peaceful resolution of Namibia's independence. Initially, the
note explores the development of the "'doctrine of mandates," which be-
came the foundation for the League of Nations mandate system, and
presents a detailed analysis of the South West Africa Mandate. Subse-
quent analysis examines the major issues of the Namibian dispute, and
considers the probability of U.N. oil sanctions against South Africa, as
well as the effectiveness of the 1977 U.N. arms embargo against South
1981, at 9; N.Y. Times, Jan. 31, 1982, at E5, col. 4. For a discussion on involvement of Cuba
and the Soviet Union in southern Africa, see STUDY COMMISSION ON U.S. POLICY ToWARD
SOUTHERN AFRICA, SOUTH AFRICA: TIME RUNNING OUT 324-34 (1981) [hereinafter cited as
Study Commission].
5 See U.N. CHARTER preamble, para. 1.
6 See U.N. CHARTER arts. 75-76. These articles charge the United Nations to establish
an International Trusteeship System for the administration and supervision of certain terri-
tories to self-government or independence. Namibia is within the category of territories to
which the U.N. Trusteeship System "shall apply" subject to the conclusion of a "trusteeship
agreement" between the United Nations and the state(s) directly concerned with the admin-
istration of the territory.
7 The Western negotiating group (also called the Contact Group) is comprised of the
five Western members of the U.N. Security Council: the United States, Great Britain, West
Germany, and Canada. In 1977, the United States initiated the formation of the Contact
Group in response to the declaration of the black African states that "they were preparing
in the Security Council to push for mandatory sanctions against South Africa on the basis of
South Africa's clear defiance of Security Council Resolution 385." The pertinent part of
Resolution 385 provides: "The Security Council... Demands that South Africa urgently
make a solemn declaration accepting the foregoing provisions for the holding of free elec-
tions in Namibia under United Nations supervision and control, undertaking to comply with
the resolutions and decisions of the United Nations and with the advisory opinion of the
International Court of Justice of 21 June 1971 in regard to Namibia, and recognizing the
territorial integrity and unity of Namibia as a nation. . . ." The Western Contract Group is
the five Western states' alternative to mandatory sanctions against South Africa. See STUDY
COMMISSION, supra note 4, at 363; S.C. Res. 384, (adopted 1885 mtg.) at 8, U.N. Doc. SIINF/
32 (1976). South Africa and other southern African nations play an important role in meet-
ing U.S. requirements for critical minerals such as chromeope, cobalt, industrial diamonds,
platinum, and vanadium.
8 Crocker, The United States and Africa, AFRICA REP., Sept.-Oct. 1981, at 7; "The U.S.
was South Africa's number one trading partner in 1980 for the third year... a two way
trade worth 3.5 billion rands, about $4.2 billion compared to $3.4 billion in 1979, an increase
of 24 percent." U.S. tops in South Africa's 1980 trade, AFRICA REP., Sept.-Oct. 1981, at 23;
See also FINANCIAL TIMES, May 20, 1981, at 10.
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Africa. Finally, the note presents several recommendations for additional
actions by the United States to assist in the peaceful independence of
Namibia.
II. THE NAMIBIAN DISPUTE: WHAT Is IT?
A. Development of the Concept of Mandates: The Pre-League Years
The Namibian dispute cannot be understood without first consider-
ing the "doctrine of mandates," which served as the basis for the League
of Nations' mandate system. The "doctrine of mandates" was developed
between 1917 and 1919.2 The Russian Revolution in 1917, followed by
United States entry into World War I (WWI) produced a climate that
was antagonistic to annexationist schemes, 10 and caused the Allied and
Associated Powers to lay increasing emphasis on progressive ideals such
as nonannexation, democracy, the right to self-determination of peoples,
and protection for minority rights." This political milieu provided the
necessary impetus for the Allied and Associated States to reconsider and
reexamine the legal parameters of colonization and annexation. As a re-
sult of this reexamination, the "mandates doctrine" was introduced. Its
fundamental principles were: International accountability of states ad-
ministering the former German and Turkish colonies; nonannexation of
such territories; 2 and the right to self-determination of peoples of such
territories. These principles were developed primarily by President
Woodrow Wilson and South African Cabinet Minister, General Jan
Smuts. 3
9 S. SLONIM, supra note 2, at 12, 21. It should be noted, however, that the "doctrine of
mandates" was derived from the concepts and principles enunciated in earlier international
agreements such as the 1885 Treaty of Berlin and the 1906 Algecieras Act. See, id. at 11.
10 Prior to 1917 (1914 to 1916), the allied states concluded several "secret" treaties to
divide the colonial territories severed from Germany and Turkey. See R. BAKER, I WOODROW
WILsoN AND WORLD Sm-rLEmENrr at chs. III-IV (1922); S. SLONIM, supra note 2, at 12.
11 The Principal Allied and Associated Powers were the states allied against Germany,
Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey during World War I. They included France, Great
Britain, Russia, the United States and many others.
'2 S. SLOmM, supra note 2, at 12.
13 The drafting of the League of Nations Mandate System was done under the direction
of President Wilson as chairperson of the League of Nations Commission. General Smuts
was also a member of the Commission. See I. SAGAY, supra note 1, at 3, 8. Furthermore,
Wilson's and Smuts' interpretation of the "doctrine of mandates' is significant since it was
the basis for the League of Nations Mandate System found in Article 22 of the Covenant of
the League. For a similar position, see I. SAGAY, supra note 1, at 2, 4, 6.
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1. The Principle of International Accountability
President Wilson's Fourteen Points1' contributed significantly to the
development of the principle of international accountability. Point V set
forth the elements of international accountability: 1) States administering
the former German and Turkish colonial territories are trustees for those
territories and for the society of nations; 2) the rights and interests of the
inhabitants of such territories and the interests of the society of nations
are the corpus of the trust; 3) the former colonies and the society of na-
tions are the beneficiaries of the trust; 4) the terms of the trust are of
international concern and may legitimately be subject to international in-
quiry; and 5) states acting as trustees may be bound by a code of
conduct. 5
General Smuts' construction of the legal significance of the principle
of international accountability is primarily presented in his pamphlet en-
titled The League of Nations: A Practical Saggestion.6 The elements of
international accountability under the Smuts' proposal were: 1) the group
of states administering the former colonies are the mandatarius, or agent,
of the League of Nations, which as mandator or principal possesses ulti-
mate authority to define, control and revoke the power of the state acting
as its agent; 2) the states administering such territories are trustees of an
international trust consisting of the rights of the population under their
administration; and 3) the beneficiaries of the trust have the right to ap-
peal to the League of Nations for redress of any breach of fiduciary obli-
gations by the state administering the territory.
The foregoing presentation of President Wilson's and General Smuts'
conception of the legal attributes of the principle of international ac-
countability reveals that this international legal principle is the progeny
of the private law doctrine of trusts and agency. President Wilson's and
General Smuts' adoption of these private law institutions to develop the
principle of international accountability is not only analytically sound,
but it is also a traditional source of international law.' 8 The League of
Nations later used the attributes of the principle of international ac-
countability, trusts and agency, to establish its mandate system.
14 56 CONG. REc. 680-81 (1918).
15 C. SEYMOUR, 4 THE INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE 153, 195 (1928).
16 J. SMUTS, THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS: A PRAcTIcAL SUGGESTION (1918), reprinted in D.
MILLER, II DRAFTING OF THE COVENANT 23-60 (1928).
1 See I. SAGAY, supra note 1, at 4-5.
'8 Another traditional source for imposing international obligations and creating inter-
national rights is "laws common to all civilized nations." J. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS
62-63 (6th ed. 1963).
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2. The Principle of Nonannexation
President Wilson and General Smuts characterized the principle of
nonannexation as the international duty to refrain from nonconsensual
annexation of the former German and Turkish colonies. 19 In his address
to Congress on February 11, 1918, President Wilson stated:
There shall be no annexations .... Peoples are not to be handed from
one sovereignty to another by an international conference or an under-
standing between rivals and antagonists. National aspirations must be
respected, peoples may now be dominated and governed only by their
own consent .... 20
This principle of nonannexation or annexation by consent was gener-
ally accepted by international consensus,2 1 and incorporated in the Cove-
nant of the League of Nations.
22
3. The Principle of Self-Determination
The essence of the principle of self-determination in 1918 was the
right of the inhabitants of non-self-governing territories to consent or to
select the authorized representative of the territory.2 3 This principle was
viewed by Wilson and Smuts as a fundamental right of international law.
Wilson's statement at the Preliminary Peace Conference illustrates this
position:
States will be picked out which have already shown that they can exer-
cise a conscience in this matter, and under their tutelage the helpless
peoples of the world will come into a new hope ... We have many in-
stances of colonies lifted into the sphere of complete self government.
This is not the discovery of a principle. It is the universal application of
principle. 2'
Subsequently, the principle of self-determination was embodied in the
1, See S. SLONIM, supra note 2, at 16-17; I. SAGAY, supra note 1, at 2, 4 & 5.
20 56 CONG. REc. 1937 (1918).
21 Acceptance of an international duty to refrain from nonconsensual annexation of for-
mer German and Turkish territories can be implied by the failure of some states to protest
the unilateral declarations of nonannexation by President Wilson, and the acquiescence of
those states, who did protest Wilson's declarations, to the nonannexationist scheme of the
Covenant of the League of Nations. For a detailed account of the protest and acquiescence
of states, see S. SLONIM, supra note 1, at 6-7.
2' Although the Covenant of the League of Nations does not contain an express provi-
sion for nonannexation, the scheme of the League's Mandate System (an international
trust) is inherently incompatible with annexation. See, e.g., LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT
art. 22, paras. 1-2; Mandate For South West Africa, Dec. 17, 1920.
20 See I. SAGAY, supra note 1, at 2; CONG. REc., supra note 20.
2 I. SAGAY, supra note 1, at 3.
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Covenant of the League of Nations."
Despite the agreement between President Wilson and General Smuts
of the legal attributes of the "mandates doctrine", they sharply disagreed
on whether South West Africa should be included as a mandate in the
emerging League of Nations. General Smuts specifically excluded South
West Africa from his proposal of the League of Nations mandate sys-
tem,2" stating that it was "inhabited by barbarians who not only cannot
possibly govern themselves but to whom it would be impracticable to ap-
ply any idea of political self determination in the European sense .... ,,17
In contrast, President Wilson envisaged universal application of the
three fundamental principles of the mandate doctrine to all former Ger-
man and Turkish colonies.28 In his address to the Trade Union Confer-
ence in London on January 5, 1918, he declared that since South West
Africa was not inhabitated by Europeans, the governing consideration
must be that South West Africa be under a temporary administration
acceptable to the inhabitants, and whose main purpose would be to pre-
vent exploitation.29 In short, Smuts viewed the legal principles of the
"mandate doctrine" unadaptable to South West Africa while President
Wilson viewed their application practicable and necessary to effectuate
South West Africa's rise to self-government. Through the process of nego-
tiations, these two diametrically opposed positions were synthesized into
Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations.
4. The Wilson-Smuts Compromise: The Creation of Article 22
Wilson's universalization of the "mandates doctrine" prompted the
drafters of Article 22 to make certain distinctions among the mandatory
states and the mandated territories.30 Likewise, the British drafted a doc-
ument which preserved General Smuts' interpretation of the "mandate
doctrine's" applicability to South West Africa. The British "compro-
mise", the Draft Convention Regarding Mandates, distinguished between
territories almost ready for independence (assisted states) and territories
"I The Covenant of the League of Nations does not expressly use the term "self-deter-
mination". However, the spirit of the principle is preserved by the language of Article 22 of
the Covenant. For example, paragraph 1 of Article 22 states that the establishment of the
Mandate System is a consequence of the inhabitants of the former German and Turkish
colonies "not yet able to stand by themselves. . . ." See also Report of the Permanent
Mandates Commission of the League of Nations, League of Nations Doc. C. 359 M. 132 1927
VI (1927), discussed in I. SAGAY, supra note 1, at 41-42; I. SAGAY, supra note 1, at 40-45.
26 See S. SLONIM, supra note 2, at 17.
27 D. MILLER, supra note 16, at 25.
28 S. SLOMM, supra note 2, at 36.
29 1. SAGAY, supra note 1, at 2.
'0 I. SAGAY, supra note 1, at 6.
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which were to be held by mandatories (vested territories)."1
President Wilson rejected the British conception of "vested territo-
ries" since it implied that independence was an unlikely goal, and favored
de facto annexation of territories such as South West Africa.2 Instead, he
insisted on a formula which would bar annexation of any former German
and Turkish colony.3 3 The Hankey-Latham draft, which embodied most
of the provisions of what later became Article 22, was introduced and
accepted provisionally on January 30, 1919.34 On February 8 the compro-
mise document was submitted to the Commission on the League on Na-
tions for insertion in the Covenant as Article 22.ss
B. The South West Africa Mandate
Article 22, the principal legal basis of the League of Nations mandate
system, established three types of mandates, labelled classes A through
C.3 South West Africa was designated a Class C mandate, and the
League of Nations grant to South Africa of a Class C mandate over South
West Africa was confirmed by the League Council on December 17,
1920. 37
The South West Africa Mandate defined the scope of South Africa's
authority to administer the territory and the legal duties incumbent upon
South Africa as the Mandatory State;8 paragraph 2 of the preamble
states that a mandate over South West Africa was awarded to the Union
of South Africa in accordance with Article 22 of the Covenant of the
League of Nations. 9 Therefore, a proper analysis of the rights, duties and
obligations arising from the South West Africa Mandate must include an
examination of the pertinent provisions of Article 22.
Paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 22 depict the key legal attributes of the
League of Nations mandate system. The paragraphs state respectively:
1) To those colonies and territories which as a consequence of the late
war have ceased to be under the sovereignty of the States which formerly
governed them and which are inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand
by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world, there
should be applied the principle that the well being and development of
such peoples form a sacred trust of civilization and that securities for the
11 D. MMLER, supra note 16, at 106-07; I. SAGAY,
22 1. SAGAY, supra note 1, at 6.
3 1. SAGAY, supra note 1, at 7.
34 I. SAGAY, supra note 1, at 7.
25 D. MILLER, supra note 16, at 271-76.
8 LEAGUE OF NAnONS COVENANT art. 22, paras. 4-6;
2, Mandate for South West Africa, supra note 22.
S. SLONIM, supra note 2, at 40.
29 Mandate for South West Africa, supra note 22, at preamble, para. 2.
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performance of this trust should be embodied in this Covenant.
2) The best method of giving practical effect to this principle is that the
tutelage of such peoples should be entrusted to advanced nations . . .
and this tutelage should be exercised by them as mandatories on behalf
of the League.'0
Three concepts emerge: a sacred trust; tutelage; and mandatory.4 ' These
4o LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT art. 22, paras. 1, 2.
41 A trust has been defined in private law as the legal relationships created when: a
person or other body holds or is bound to manage property or other legal rights for or on the
behalf of another or others (cestuis que trust), and for the property or rights are held in
trust for that other or those others (the beneficiaries) and for that purpose or those pur-
poses that are set forth by the settlor or creator of the trust. HALSBuRy's LAWS OF ENGLAND
(4th ed. 1973). For a similar position, see I. SAGAY supra note 1, at 17. In short, a trust is a
property arrangement or relationship among three parties with respect to real or personal
property or other legal rights. The three persons involved in the trust relationship are the
settlor, the trustee and the beneficiary or cestuis que trust. The real or personal property, or
the set of legal rights which is the subject of the trust, is called the corpus of the trust.
The trust relationship is created when the following elements are satisfied: 1) the settlor
or legal title owner of certain property or rights transfers legal title of such property or
rights to another, the trustee, for the benefit of the cestuis que trust; 2) the settlor transfers
legal title of such property or rights to the trustee with the intent to create enforceable
fiduciary obligations upon the trustee with respect to the cestuis que trust; and 3) the trans-
fer is effected by actual, symbolic or constructive delivery of the property or other rights to
the trustee. The legal effect of the trust arrangement is that it creates legal title of the
corpus in the trustee and grants the cestuis que trust (beneficiary) an equitable property
interest.
Another important attribute of the trust arrangement in private law is that the trustee's
management of the trust corpus is subject to the terms prescribed by the settlor. For exam-
ple, the settlor may include express provisions in the trust agreement stating the purpose of
the trust, defining the duration of the trust, and delineating the means of distributing the
trust upon its termination. Furthermore, where no express provision for distribution or du-
ration is included in the trust agreement, the terms of distribution and duration may be
implied from the following: (1) the language of the trust agreement; (2) the reasons for the
trust; and (3) the circumstances attendant to the creation of the trust. If no terms of distri-
bution upon termination of the trust are found, the legal title of the corpus reverts to the
settlor. As shall be shown later in the note, this allowance of implied terms of distribution
and duration was critical to the determination of the rights and duties arising from the
South West Africa Mandate. For a discussion on the principles of Trusts see generally, G.G.
BOG RT & G.T. BOGERT, TRUSTS (5th ed. 1973).
The private law doctrine of tutelage is best described as the legal rights and obligations
arising from the guardian ward relationship. Tutela, a progeny of Roman Private Law, is
that species of guardianship of males that continued until the ward reached puberty. The
guardianship was established because of the special need to protect the property and rights
of the male under puberty. Accordingly, the concomitants to the tutelage are: (1) the guard-
ian's legal obligation to properly and nonnegligently manage the property and rights of the
ward; (2) the guardian's submission to court supervision: (3) the guardian's removal for mis-
conduct or negligence; and (4) the termination of the tutelage when the ward reaches pu-
berty. As previously indicated, the League of Nations used the term tutelage to describe one
of the legal attributes of its mandate system. See W. BUCKLAND, MANUAL OF ROMAN PRIVATE
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three concepts are adaptations of Wilson's and Smuts' principle of inter-
national accountability.42 The use of trust, tutelage and mandatories,
which are all general principles of law recognized by all civilized nations,
was deliberate.
1. Rights and Duties of the South West Africa Mandate
On June 28, 1919, Germany transferred all of its legal and equitable
rights in the territory of South West Africa to the Allied and Associated
States,' 3 which thereafter agreed to transfer legal and equitable title of
South West Africa to the League of Nations upon the condition that the
League include South West Africa in its mandate system pursuant to Ar-
ticle 22 of the League of Nations Covenant. 44 In effect, the League of Na-
tions was given rights analogous to a fee simple in South West Africa
subject to a condition precedent. The League satisfied this condition on
January 10, 1920, when the Covenant of the League came into force; Arti-
cle 22, paragraph 6 of the Covenant provided for the establishment of the
South West Africa Mandate.
Paragraph 1 of Article 22 authorized the League of Nations to estab-
lish a "sacred trust of civilization" for each of the former enemy territo-
ries.45 The corpus of the South West Africa trust was the territory of
LAw 89-102 (2nd ed. 1939); I. SAGAY, supra note 1, at 24.
The private law elements of a mandatum are a request to tender gratuitous service and
consent or acceptance of the request. The requestor of the gratuitous service is deemed the
mandator or principal while the acceptor of the request is deemed the mandatarious or
agent. Since the mandatum or agency is a consensual and gratuitous arrangement, it is usu-
ally subject to a limited period of time. In accordance with this condition of temporality,
termination of the mandatum occurs when there is completion of the gratuitous service,
impossibility to render the gratuitous service, mutual waiver of rights, revocation of the
agency by the principal, or renunciation of the agency. The mandatum requires the
mandatarius or agent to act within the contours of the authority vested in him by the
mandator or principal. The mandatum also imposes fiduciary obligations upon the
mandatarius to reasonably perform the gratuitous services and to act in the highest interest
of the mandator. See W. BucKLANI, TEXTBOOK OF Roman Law 514-18 (3rd ed. 1966); L
SAGAY, supra note 1, at 23. The preceding presentation of the private law meanings of trust,
tutelage and mandatum is essential to the analysis of the rights and obligations arising from
the South Africa Mandate-a species of trust, tutelage and mandatum. to the League of
Nations: first, it necessarily follows that in order for the League of Nations to grant South
Africa a Mandate or "international trust" the League of Nations must possess legal and
equitable title to the subject matter of the "international trust" (South West Africa) and
second, the phrase "agreed that, in accordance with Article 22. . ." describes the condition
upon which the Allied and Associated Powers "agreed" to relinquish all of their property
rights in South West Africa. See South West Africa Status Case (U.N. v. S.A.), 1950 I.C.J.
"I See L SAGAY, supra note 1, at 17.
43 Id.
44 Id.
45 LEAGUE OF NATIONS art. 22, para. 1.
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South West Africa and the aggregate rights of the inhabitants of the ter-
ritory."s The League of Nations effectuated the trust when it transferred
legal title of the corpus to South Africa for the benefit of the inhabitants
of South West Africa, and for the interests of the organized world com-
munity. The League of Nations made this transfer with the intent to
create fiduciary obligations enforceable in international law. The grant of
the "sacred trust" of South West Africa occurred on December 17, 1920
when the League Council confirmed delivery of the South West Africa
Mandate to South Africa.
As trustee, South Africa's management of the trust corpus was sub-
ject to the terms prescribed by the League of Nations in Article 22 and
the South West Africa Mandate. Neither Article 22 nor the South West
Africa Mandate clearly defines the purpose, duration, or means of distri-
bution of the trust upon its termination. However, these conditions may
be implied from the language of the Covenant, the reasons for the trust,
and the circumstances surrounding its creation.47
The drafters of Article 22 and the South West Africa Mandate sub-
stantially adopted President Wilson's position that the purpose of creat-
ing the South West Africa trust was to bar annexation and foster self-
determination." The trust was to terminate when the inhabitants of the
territory were "able to stand by themselves under the strenuous condi-
tions of the modern world. ' 49 Accordingly, upon termination of the trust,
the inhabitants of South West Africa were to receive all the legal rights
conferred upon a sovereign state.
Defining the termination of the trust as when South West Africa is
"able to stand by itself" poses two major questions. First, what is the
proper body to determine when South West Africa is capable of standing
by itself; and second, what criteria should be used by this body to make
such a determination. Arguably paragraph 9 of Article 22 of the Covenant
answers the first question by establishing the Permanent Mandates Com-
mission. 0 The function of the Commission was to "receive and examine
the annual reports of the Mandatories and to advise the Council on all
46 Id.; Mandate For South West Africa, supra note 22, arts. 2-3, 5.
"4See generally, G.G. BOGERT & G.T. BOGERT, supra note 41.
'8 Contra S. SLONIM, supra note 2, at 37.
49 Itsejuwa Sagay expounds a similar view. He states that a form of "termination which
took the attention of the League of Nations [was] principally the grant of independence
which was generally admitted as the goal of the mandates system. . . ... See I. SAGAY, supra
note 1, at 39.
1o Paragraph 9 of Article 22 reads:
A permanent Commission shall be constituted to receive and examine the annual
reports of the Mandatories, and to advise the Council on all matters relating to
the observance of the mandates.
LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT art. 22, para. 9.
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matters relating to the observance of the mandates." 51 The Council of the
League and the Permanent Mandates Commission were therefore the ap-
propriate bodies to determine when the South West Africa trust would
terminate.
The second question was also addressed by the Commission. It re-
ceived annual reports from the trustee State which included a lengthy
questionaire and covered the complete administration of the trust.52 This
method enabled the Commission to determine the relative annual status
of every aspect of the trust.5 3 Furthermore, the inhabitants of South West
Africa, as beneficiaries, had the right to petition the Commission for re-
dress of any breach of the trust relationship.5
The following conclusions can be made of South Africa's rights and
duties as trustee of the South West Africa trust:
1) South Africa, has an enforceable right in international law to adminis-
ter the territory of South West Africa;
2) South Africa was vested with fiduciary obligations to reasonably ad-
ministrate the land and personal property of South West Africa, and act
in the highest interest of the People of South West Africa when adminis-
tering their right to material, moral and social progress;
3) the people of South West Africa, as beneficiaries of the trust, were
entitled to petition the Permanent Mandates Commission for redress of
any breach of the trust by South Africa;
4) the Council of the League of Nations and the Permanent Mandates
Commission were the authorized bodies to determine when the South
West Africa trust terminated; and
5) the people of South West Africa were entitled to receive legal title to
South West Africa upon termination of the trust.5
C. The Dispute
The dispute between the United Nations and South Africa regarding
the legality of South Africa's presence in Namibia (South West Africa)
has its source in the interplay of several key factors: (1) the emergence of
Asian and African States as members of the United Nations; (2) the es-
tablishment of the United Nations (3) the dissolution of the League of
Nations in 1946; (4) South Africa's open denial of its obligations under
51 Id.
52 S. SLONIM, supra note 2, at 46.
53 S. SLONIM, supra note 2, at 46.
The right to petition was not expressly mentioned in the Covenant of the League of
Nations or the Mandates. The right was first granted by the Council of the League of Na-
tions on January 31, 1923. See Report of the Permanent Mandates Commission on the Pro-
cedure in Respect of Petitions, League of Nations Doc. C.44(1)M.73. 1923.Vl.(1923), dis-
cussed in S. SLONIM, supra note 2, at 47.
55 Compare I. SAGAY, supra note 1, at 27.
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the South West Africa Mandate; and (5) the United Nation's revocation
of South Africa's mandate over South West Africa.
5 6
The events of World War II triggered the powerful assertion by
Asian and African States that international law accorded dependent terri-
tories the right to self-determination.5 7 The U.N. Charter became the le-
gal basis for this assertion.
The Charter of the United Nations was drafted at San Francisco in
1945. Unlike the Covenant of the League of Nations, the U.N. Charter
uses the phrase "self-determination" when defining the purposes of the
United Nations and establishing obligations among member states to pro-
mote international economic and social cooperation. Article 76 states
that a basic objective of the U.N. Trusteeship System, in accordance with
the United Nations purposes, set forth in Article I of the Charter, is to
"promote the political . . . advancement of the inhabitants of the trust
territories, and their progressive development toward self-government or
independence."59 This clear pledge to the right to self-government or in-
dependence not only reflects the great progress made in the United Na-
tions regarding international accountability, but also establishes that the
right to self-determination is enforceable in international law.60
The United Nations establishment of the International Trusteeship
System was followed by the League of Nations adoption of its final reso-
lution regarding the South West Africa Mandate. This resolution,
adopted in 1946 during the last session of the League, expressed the in-
tentions of South Africa and all other mandatories to administer the
mandated territories in accordance with the existing obligations until
other arrangements were agreed upon by the United Nations and the re-
spective Mandatory State. 1
However, in 1946 South Africa submitted to the General Assembly a
lengthy and comprehensive memorandum requesting the incorporation of
South West Africa into the Union of South Africa. 2 The United Nations
86 Cf. S. SLONIM, supra note 2, at 59.
7 See S. SLONIM, supra note 2, at 59.
58 Articles 1(2) and 55 of the U.N. Charter provide respectively:
The Purposes of the United Nations are: To develop friendly relations among na-
tions based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of
peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal
peace .... With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-being
which are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations based on
respect for the principle of equal rights and self determination of peoples .
the United Nations shall promote: ....
89 U.N. CHARTER art. 76, para. b.
80 For a similar proposition, see S. SLONIM, supra note 2, at 60.
6' LEAGUE OF NATIONS O.J. Spec. Supp. 58, at 278-79 (1946), cited in I. SAGAY, supra
note 2, at 30.
82 The following reasons were set forth by South Africa in support of incorporating
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rejected this request on the grounds that the African inhabitants of South
West Africa had not achieved sufficient political autonomy to express a
considered opinion on incorporation. However, the General Assembly
did invite South Africa to propose a trusteeship agreement for South
West Africa.
South Africa refused both this invitation and one issued in 1947.64
South Africa, however, did submit a report of its administration of South
West Africa6 5 for the year of 1947. The report was considered in detail by
the U.N. Trusteeship Council, 6 which heavily critized nearly all aspects
of South Africa's administration of South West Africa. 7 This unfavorable
report, coupled with the United Nations increasing criticism of South Af-
rica's policy of apartheid, prompted South Africa to make the following
South West Africa:
a) The fundamental principle of the mandates and trusteeship systems is "ulti-
mate self-government and separate statehood"; but the low economic potential of
the territory and "the backwardness of the vast majority of the population"
render this impossible of achievement impossible;
b) Development of the territory would involve great expense for the Mandatory,
which in the nature of things it could not undertake and
c) Uncertainty as to the ultimate future of the territory militated against racial
tranquility and optimum development of the territory.
The soundness of these reasons is doubtful at best. With respect to the first reason
advanced, "economic potential" is not an element of statehood. A territory meets the ele-
ments of statehood in international law when there is: (1) a permanent population, (2) a
clearly defined geographical boundary, (3) a government or authorized representative to run
the affairs of the state, and (4) a capacity to enter into relations with other states. Obvi-
ously, any emerging state will need capital to implement and maintain its governmental
machinery, but a projection of economic wealth is not required in determining the capability
for self-government and statehood. Further, the characterization of the inhabitants of South
West Africa as "backward" is highly subjective and only testifies to the degree which South
Africa was effectively performing its legal duty to "promote to the utmost the social pro-
gress of the inhabitants of the territory. . ." through the educational process. An illustra-
tion of South Africa's diligence in fulfilling this obligation is that in 1939, the South African
Government spent 100 to educate white children for every 1 spent on a "native" child. See
Minutes of Permanent Mandates Commission of the League of Nations, League of Nations
Doc. discussed in I. SAGAY, supra note 1, at 120-24. The second and third reasons are
equally unfounded. The legal alternative to South Africa bearing the total expense of devel-
oping South West Africa was for South Africa to request the United Nations, the League of
Nations' successor, to bear a portion of the expense since South West Africa is an "interna-
tional trust." See D. MILLER, supra note 16, at 104. Finally, racial tranquillity is inherenetly
incompatible with the system of apartheid; thus, apartheid and not the "uncertainty as to
the ultimate future of the territory" militated against racial tranquillity and optimum devel-
opment of the territory" of South West Africa.
63 G.A. Res. 65(I), U.N. Doc. A/64/Add. 1, at 123 (1946).
"Id. G.A. Res. 141, U.N. Doc. A/519, at 47 (1947).
e' 1 U.N. GAOR (1104th plen. mtg.) at 573, U.N. Doc. A.422 (1947).
U.N. GAOR (164th plen. mtg.) at 577, 590 U.N. Doc. A/734 (1948).
17 Id.; See also I. SAGAY, supra note 1, at 48.
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unilaterial declarations:
The South West Africa Mandate had expired upon the dissolution of the
League of Nations;
South Africa's international obligations under the mandate had termi-
nated with the mandate's expiration; and
the U.N. Trusteeship Council lacked competence to make binding recom-
mendations on matters of internal administration of South West Africa."
These declarations posed a major legal problem to the United Na-
tions. If the South West Africa Mandate had lapsed, the territory of
South West Africa no longer had international status but was a de facto if
not a de jure part of the territory of South Africa.69 Assuming the South
West Africa Mandate had not lapsed, the United Nations could not peti-
tion South Africa to conclude a trusteeship agreement or submit annual
reports of administration, since it lacked competency to exercise the su-
pervisory powers of the dissolved League.70 As a result, in 1950 the U.N.
General Assembly adopted its first resolution to submit the issues arising
from the dissolution of the League to the International Court of Justice.
1. Decisions of the International Court of Justice
a. The Issue of the Survival of the South West Africa
In the 1950 Status of South West Africa case, the International
Court of Justice (ICJ) rejected South Africa's expiration argument.7 1
South Africa argued that since the mandate or agency relationship re-
quires at least two parties, one of whom must be the principal (the
League of Nations), it is legally impossible for a mandate to continue to
survive after the demise of the principal.7 2 In rejecting this argument, the
Court first pointed out that its duty was not to apply the private law
rules of mandatum "lock, stock, and ready made,' 73 but rather, to "regard
any features or terminology which are reminiscent of the rules and insti-
)174tutions of private law as an indication of policy and principles....
The Court, in essence, rejected the application of the private law rule that
the mandate expires upon the death of the mandator or principal. The
Court found this argument inconsistent with the dispositive character of
the mandate system, and violative of the mandate system's objective to
08 Union Government's Views Submitted on S-W Africa, 8 U.N. BULL. 536-37 (1950); I.
SAGAY, supra note 1, at 48.
1' I. SAGAY, supra note 1, at 48.
70 . SAGAY, supra note 1, at 48-49.
71 Status of S.W.A. case (U.N. v. S.A.), 1950 I.C.J. 128 (Advisory Opinion of July 11).
72 Id. at 277.




hold the mandated territories as a "sacred trust of civilization" until they
achieve self government or independence. Furthermore, had the mandate
lapsed, South Africa's authority to administer the territory, which is
based on the mandate, would also have lapsed.75
A third analysis set forth by the Court was that the mandate con-
ferred upon South West Africa certain real rights giving it international
status.76 This status supplied the element of permanence which allowed
the South West Africa Mandate to survive the dissolution of the
League.7 The International Court of Justice later confirmed its 1950 de-
cision in the South West Africa Judgment of 1962 and the Namibia case
in 1971. 7 8
b. The Issue of the United Nations Right to Exercise the Supervisory
Functions of the League
When the Court declared that the South West Africa Mandate had
survived the dissolution of the League of Nations, it also affirmed South
Africa's obligations under the Mandate. They included: 1) the duty to
submit to international supervision; 2) the duty to submit annual reports
of administration of the mandate; and 3) the duty to transmit petitions
from the people of South West Africa.7 9 In view of the survival of the
Mandate, and South Africa's obligations thereunder, the Court reasoned
that international supervision of the Mandate was an indispensable con-
dition for effective performance of the "sacred trust of civilization."80 The
Court then concluded that
[the] General Assembly of the United Nations is legally qualified to exer-
cise the supervisory functions previously exercised by the League of Na-
tion with regard to the administration (South West Africa) and the
Union of South Africa is under an obligation to submit to the supervision
and control of the General Assembly and to render annual reports to it.8'
Nevertheless, South Africa maintained its position, and its non-
cooperative stance was followed by the General Assembly's adoption of
75 Id. at 133.
71 Id. at 156-57.
77 Id.
78 South West Africa cases (Ethiopa v. S.A.; Liberia v. S.A.), 1962 I.C.J. 319 (Prelimi-
nary Objections of Dec. 21); Namibia (South West Africa) case, 1971 I.C.J. 16 (Advisory
Opinion of June 21).
11 See Status of S.W.A. case, supra note 71, at 133, 136-37; LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVE-
NANT art. 22, paras. 7, 8, 9; Report of the Permanent Mandates Commission, supra note 54;
I. SAGAY, supra note 1, at 59.
'o I. SAGAY, supra note 1, at 60.
" Status of S.W.A. case, supra note 71, at 137. The Court confirmed its view in the
South West Africa Judgment of 1962. South West Africa cases, supra note 78, at 333-34.
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Resolution 2145 which declared the following:
1) the South West Africa Mandate exercised by the government of the
Union of South Africa is terminated;
2) South Africa has no other right to administor South West Africa;
3) South West Africa is henceforth under the direct responsibility of the
United Nations; and
4) South West Africa will retain its international status until it achieves
independence.2
When South Africa denied the General Assembly's competence to revoke
its mandate over South West Africa.8 3 The stage was set for the ICJ dis-
position of the Namibia case in 1971.
c. Legal Consequences of South Africa's Continued Presence in Namibia
On March 20, 1969, the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution
264 which formally recognized the General Assembly's revocation of the
South West Africa Mandate.84 This resolution was significant because it
reinforced the legality of the General Assembly resolution which revoked
the mandate.8 5 When South Africa failed to comply with Resolution 264
and the subsequent resolution regarding South Africa's illegal presence in
Namibia, the Security Council requested an advisory opinion of the Inter-
national Court of Justice on the legal consequences of the continued pres-
ence of South Africa in Namibia.8 In its advisory opinion of June 21,
1971, the Court held that South Africa's presence in Namibia was illegal.
South Africa was therefore under an international obligation to withdraw
immediately. The Court also held that all states were under an interna-
tional obligation to recognize the illegality of South Africa's presence in
Namibia and to act accordingly.87 Nonetheless, South Africa maintained
82 G.A. Res. 2145, U.N. GAOR Supp. (Nos. 7-16) at 2, U.N. Doc. A/L 483/Add. 1-3 & A/
L. 488 (1966).
83 U.N. SCOR Special Supp. (No. 2) at 43, U.N. Doc. S/9463 (1969).
84 Security Council Resolution 264 also pronounced "that the continued presence of
South Africa in Namibia is illegal" and called upon South Africa to immediately withdraw
from Namibia. See, S.C. Res. 264 (adopted 1464th mtg.) at 1, U.N. Doc. S/INF/24.1 Rev.1
(1969).
85 For a similar proposition, see S. SLONIM, supra note 2, at 326; See also the Namibia
case where the Court held that the U.N. General Assembly "lacking the necessary powers to
ensure the withdrawal of South Africa from the Territory, . . . enlisted the cooperation of
the Security Council." Namibia (South West Africa) case, supra note 109, at 51.
86 S.C. Res. 284 (adopted 1550th mtg.) at 4, U.N. Doc. S/INF/25 (1970). In S.C. Resolu-
tion 276, the Security Council reaffirmed that the continued presence of South African offi-
cials in Namibia is illegal and declared that as a result, all acts taken by the South African
Government on behalf of or concerning Namibia is illegal and invalid. S.C. Res. 276
(adopted 1529th mtg.) at 1, U.N. Doc. S/INF/25 (1970).
87 South West Africa case, supra note 78, at 54-56. The Court set forth four general
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its position that General Assembly Resolution 2145 and any Security
Council resolutions based upon 2145 were invalid. Accordingly, it rejected
the Court's determination."8
South Africa's persistent refusal to accept the decisions of the Inter-
national Court of Justice and to comply with the resolutions of the Secur-
ity Council left the United Nations with two alternatives: Security Coun-
cil implementation of Chapter VII Article 41 devices," or direct
negotiations with the government of South Africa. The Security Council
did not invoke Chapter VII, Article 41, sanctions against South Africa
and thus, the United Nations began direct negotiations with South Africa
in March, 1972.0
2. Period of Negotiations: 1972 to 1982
a. The Waldheim-Escher Era
The United Nations began the first phase of negotiations with the
government of South Africa on March 6, 1972.1 At that time, the South
African Government confirmed that its policy was one of self-determina-
tion and independence.9 2 A second important development of this first
phase of U.N.-South Africa negotiations was the participation of the non-
white Namibians to the negotiations."
categories of the legal consequences for member states of the United Nations. Id.
" On June 21, 1971, (the day of the Court's decision), South African Prime Minister
Vorsted stated that the Court's opinion was "entirely untenable" and represented "the re-
sult of political maneuvering instead of objective jurisprudence." See N.Y. Times, June 22,
1971, at 3, col 5; 31 U.N. SCOR Supp. (Jan.-Mar. 1976) at 39, U.N. Doc. S/11948.
89 Article 41 of Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter provides that:
The Security Council may decide [if it determines the existence of any threat to
the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression] what measures not involving
the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it
may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. These
may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea,
air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the sever-
ence of diplomatic relations.
U.N. CHARTsR art. 41.
90 27 U.N. SCOR Supp. (July-Sept. 1972) at 64, U.N. Doc. S/10738 (1972).
91 Id. at 65.
82 Id.
"3 The non-white Namibian group consisted of the following: Chief Clemens Kapuuo
(the paramount chief of the Hereros), representatives of the National Convention of Non
Whites, the South West Africa Peoples Organization (SWAPO, the freedom fighters), the
National Unity Democratic Organization, the South West Africa National Union, the Voice
of the People, the Rehoboth Volkspartei, the Rehoboth Baster Vereniging and the Federal
Coloured Peoples' Party. See id. at 66, 67; I. SAGAY, supra note 1, at 344. The non white
Namibians informed Secretary General Waldheim that "they looked upon the United Na-
tions to fulfill it resolutions by obtaining the withdrawal of South Africa's presence from the
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The second phase of negotiations began on October 8, 1972, when
Special Representative Alfred M. Escher made his visit to South Africa
and Namibia.14 Negotiations floundered, however, because South African
Prime Minister Vorster refused to elaborate on the critical question of
South Africa's interpretation of its obligations under its declared policy of
self-determination, and independence for Namibia and of its formulation
of practical steps-to be taken towards Namibia's independence. s5 Vorster
did state, however, that regional experience in self-government was a
South African prerequisite to Namibia's self-determination and indepen-
dence.9 6 Consequently, this phase of the U.N.-South Africa negotiations
left the two key issues unanswered. As a result, the Security Council
voted unanimously to cease all further discussion with South Africa on
the self-determination and independence of Namibia.9 '
D. The Western Contact Group
The United Nations failure to secure South Africa's withdrawal from
Namibia and to effectuate Namibia's independence, led to the creation of
the Western Contact Group in 1977 by the United States." The Group's
function is best characterized as a hybrid of mediation where interested,
rather than disinterested, States participate in negotiations between dis-
puting States.99 Because the attribute of disinterest is essential to the me-
diator's effectiveness in proposing an acceptable and unbias solution to
the dispute,10 the Group's mediatorial performance has been impeded.
Nevertheless, it has secured South Africa's acceptance of Resolution 435,
United Nations presence in Namibia during a pre-independence transi-
tion period, and a set of constitutional guidelines for pre-independence
elections.'0 '
The goals of the five-nation Western Contact Group are to maintain
territory and the establishment of a unitary and a popularly elected government either im-
mediately or after a short interim period." I. SAGAY, supra note 1, at 345.
94 27 U.N. SCOR Supp. (Oct.-Dec. 1972) at 32-33, U.N. Doc. S/10738 (1972).
95 Id. at 95; I. SAGAY, supra note 1, at 346.
Id.; I. SAGAY, supra note 1, at 346.
97 S.C. Res. 342 (adopted 1758th mtg.) at 1, U.N. Doc. SIINF/29 (1973).
:8 See note 7 and accompanying text supra.
" See DAVID DAVIES MEMORIAL INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, INTERNATIONAL
DISPUTES: THE LEGAL ASPECTS 83 (1972). The member states of the Western Contact Group
have from substantial to moderate economic interests with South Africa. For example, Great
Britain, the United States, West Germany and France represent four of the five countries
that hold 80 percent of the foreign investment in South Africa. See STUDY COMMISSION,
supra note 4, at 133. See also, note 8 and accompanying text supra. Significant economic
interest compounded with political concerns makes the members of the Contact Group "in-
terested parties" to the Namibian dispute.
100 Cf. DAVID DAVIES, supra note 99, at 85.
101 N.Y. Times supra note 4.
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negotiations with South Africa and other interested African States, and
to develop a plan acceptable to all the parties in dispute.102 The Contact
Group has acknowledged that it must maintain its impartiality and its
credibility at an equilibrium between the parties in dispute in order to
achieve these objectives. The difficulty of this delicate task is com-
pounded since each member of the Contact Group has a moderate to sub-
stantial economic interest in South Africa. Thus, while it has successfully
fulfilled the "urgent requirement" of re-establishing "a level of credibility
and influence in the South African Government." the Contact Group has
lost much of its credibility among the African parties to the dispute. 10 3
The reasons advanced for the African parties' sharp distrust of the
Contact Group's impartiality toward South Africa are numerous. One re-
curring reason for the distrust is the continued substantial investment in
South Africa, particularly by the United States. 04 For example, South
West African People's Organization (SWAPO) and the other interested
African States have expressed doubts about the Contact Group's pro-
posed constitutional guidelines. 05 Consequently, even if the Contact
Group can reassure the African parties that the guidelines are essentially
fair, the latest target date for an independent Namibia, early 1983 may
slip out of reach. 06
102 Namibia, 81 DEPT. OF STATE BuLL. 86 (1981).
103 Question-and-Answer Sessibn Following Foreign Policy Association, 81 DEPT. ST.
BULL. 32 (1980); See, e.g., Africa remains skeptical as West works on UN Namibia plan,
AFRICA REP., Sept.-Oct 1981, at 23; Seller, Which Way in Southern Africa? AFRICA REP.
May-June 1981, at 17-18.
04 After the United Kingdom, the United States is the largest foreign investor in South
Africa. Furthermore, U.S. direct investment in the most rapidly growing sectors of the
South African economy-manufacturing, mining, and petroleum-has steadily increased.
For example, U.S. direct investment in South Africa had a 535% increase between 1950 and
1970; and in 1980, the United States was South Africa's number one trading partner for the
third consecutive year. Further, oil in South Africa is imported, refined and marketed by six
transnational firms, three of which are U.S. nationals-Mobil, Caltex and Exxon. These
three U.S. firms control approximately 40% of South Africa's petroleum products market; in
1977, Mobil had $333 million invested in South Africa and Caltex was involved in a $134
million expansion that was designated to increase South Africa's refining capacity by 11%.
L. MACKLER, PATTERN FOR PROFIT IN SOUTHERN AFRICA 41 (1972); B. ROGERS, WHITE
WEALTH AND BLACK PovERTY: AMERICAN INVESTMENTS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA 141 (1976). This
direct U.S. investment valued at $2 billion a year and trade of $3.4 billion a year has created
distrust among the black African states. Bishop Desmond TuTu, general secretary of the
South African Council of Churches, exemplified black Africa's perception of foreign invest-
ment in South Africa when he declared that foreign investors who advocate the "progressive
force" theory (i.e., the theory the continued investment in the South African economy will
eventually raise the black African to full equality) are "lying [and] ... must know that they
are investing to buttress one of the most vicious systems since Nazism." THE GUARDIAN
(London), Mar. 31, 1981; Cf. STUDY COMMISSION, supra note 4, at 394.
105 N.Y. Times, supra note 4.
106 N.Y. Times, supra note 4.
1982
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
Should the Contact Group fail to propose an unbiased solution to the
dispute, the imposition of extensive U.N. economic sanctions against
South Africa may be the only remaining alternative, short of regional war.
III. IMPOSITION OF U.N. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA:
Is IT PROBABLE OR EFFECTIVE?
Peaceful settlement of Namibia's independence is critical to the rep-
utation of the United Nations. In keeping with its role of maintaining
international peace and security,10 7 the United Nations uses two principal
approaches to deal with specific disputes: 1) implementation of Chapter
VI, Article 33 methods of peaceful settlement of disputes or 2) implemen-
tation of Chapter VII Article 41 sanctions.108 U.N. efforts to settle the
Namibian dispute under the first approach have been futile; the South
African Government has rejected the decisions of the I.C.J., and direct
negotiations between the United Nations and South Africa have left the
two major issues unresolved. South Africa's illegal presence in Namibia
continues despite the United Nations employment of Chapter VI Article
33 devices. Arguably, the only remaining alternative is the implementa-
tion of Article 41 sanctions against South Africa.
A. Probability of U.N. Economic Sanctions Against South Africa
In 1964 the United Nations established the Expert Committee of the
Security Council to consider the feasibility of implementing U.N. sanc-
tions against South Africa. 109 The Committee concluded that Security
Council imposition of Article 41 sanctions against South Africa was in-
deed feasible. 10 The Committee's feasibility report proved to be accurate
since the U.N. Security Council imposed its first mandatory arms em-
1* U.N. Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar the prospect of war in the region of
Namibia. He stated, "The present impasse is dangerous not only for the situation in
Namibia itself, but also for the prospects of a peaceful ... future for the region .... N.Y.
Times, supra note 3.
108 Article 33 of the U.N. Charter provides that:
The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the
maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution
by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement,
... or other peaceful means of their own choice....
The U.N. has attempted negotiations and judicial proceedings as a means of peacefully set-
tling the dispute, and the other methods are not as appropriate since the United Nations is
a party to the dispute. See also, note 89.




bargo against South Africa in 1977.11 Despite this action, a long and divi-
sive debate continues in the United Nations regarding mandatory oil and
trade sanctions against the Union of South Africa. Nigerian President
Shehu Shagari contends that "the Western powers are using their veto to
block the oil embargo which is the only way-I say the only way" to se-
cure South Africa's withdrawal from Namibia."' President Shagari's con-
tention adequately identifies the "power" governing the likelihood of Se-
curity Council imposition of mandatory oil and trade sanctions against
South Africa. This governing power is the "veto power or the right of the
five permanent members of the Security Council to prevent the adoption
of a proposed course of action.""" Accordingly, an examination of the
"veto power" is a necessary prerequiste to a conclusion on the feasibility
of mandatory oil and trade sanctions against South Africa.
The five permanent members of the Security Council are the United
States, Britain, France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the
' S.C. Res. 418 (adopted 2046th mtg.) at 5, U.N. Doc. S/INF/33 (1977).
11 THE GUARDIAN (London), Mar. 21, 1981, at 17, col. 2. In 1979, the General Assembly
adopted Resolution which requested the Security Council "to consider urgently a mandatory
embargo on the supply of petroleum and petroleum products to South Africa under Chapter
VII of the Charter of the United States." G.A. Res. 34193, 46 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 25) at
32, U.N. Doc. A/34/46 (1979). The Resolution proposed that the Security Council require
member states to comply with the following:
(a) To enact legislation to prohibit:
(i) The sale or supply of petroleum and petroleum products to any person
or body in South Africa, or to any other person or body for the purpose of
eventual supply to South Africa;
(ii) Any activities by their nationals or in their territories which promote
or are calculated to promote the sale or supply of petroleum or petroleum
products to South Africa;
(iii) The shipment in vessels or aircraft of their registration, or under
charter to their nationals, of any petroleum or petroleum products to South
Africa;
(iv) The supply of any services, including inter alia technical advice, spare
parts and capital, to the oil companies in South Africa;
(v) The provision of facilities in their ports or airports to vessels or air-
craft carrying petroleum or petroleum products to South Africa;
(vi) Any investments in, or provision of technical or other assistance to, to
the petroleum industry in South Africa;
(b) To include in all contracts for the sale of petroleum and petroleum prod-
ucts provisions prohibiting direct or indirect resale to South Africa;
(c) To take effective legislative and other appropriate measures to prevent
petroleum companies an shipping companies, as well as banks and other financial
institutions, from giving any assistance to the South African regime in circum-
venting the oil embargo, including the seizure of vessels which violate the embargo
and their cargoes;
"' The phrase "veto power" is not in the U.N. Charter. See. S. CHEN, THE THEORY AND
PR A C TICE OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 54 (1973).
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People's Republica of China."" Chapter V, Article 27, of the U.N. Charter
provides that all non-procedural decisions of the Security Council must
be "made by an affirmative vote of nine members including the concur-
ring votes of the permanent members. ... 15 In effect, Article 27 grants
any one of the "Big Five" the power to block a resolution regarding sub-
stantive matters."' A permanent member can thus prevent the adoption
of a resolution by either casting a negative vote or persuading at least
seven other members to join it in abstention.1 7 This second method of
defeating a resolution, the "hidden veto",118 was used to block the adop-
tion of a Security Council resolution mandating oil and trade embargos
against South Africa.1
One theory frequently advanced to justify the exercise of the "veto
power" is the "chain of events" theory, which is based on the assumption
that a determination by the Security Council that a particular dispute or
situation constitutes a "threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of
agression" will generate enforcement action. 20 While this assumption is
logical, the conclusion that it is necessary to exercise the "veto power" or
the "hidden veto" to prevent the use of enforcement measures is both
unsound and inconsistent with the principles of the United Nations. One
such principle is that each member of the Security Council has a legal
duty to make a good faith and reasonable determination of what consti-
tutes "a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of agression", and
to implement appropriate measures to remove the threat in the interest
of international peace and security. 2'
A more theoretically honest ground for exercising the "veto power"
:14 U.N. CHARTER art. 23, para. 1.
15 U.N. CHARTER art. 27, para. 3.
:16 See S. CHEN, supra note 146, at 54.
"7 S. CHEN, supra note 113, at 54, 55.
118 S. CHEN, supra note 113, at 55.
119 There are arguable two reasons why the United States does not support the imple-
mentation of a mandatory oil and trade embargo against South Africa: (1) such "harsh"
sanctions would seriously disrupt and undo the present "level of credibility and influence
(the United States has) in the South African Government; and correspondingly, the achieve-
ments of the Western Contract Group would be seriously undermined; and (2) such sanc-
tions would.be catastrophic to the 350 plus U.S. transnational corporations with subsidaries
in South Africa and over 6,000 doing business in South Africa; (b) the over 50% U.S. direct
investment by Ford, General Motors, Mobil and Caltex; and (c) the $4.2 billion U.S. trade
with South Africa. See STUDY COMMISSION, supra note 4, at 135. The catastrophic effect of a
mandatory oil and trade embargo on U.S. transnational corporations, and thus the U.S.
economy is compounded by the fact that South Africa has no known commercial oil deposits
and two of its key sectors transport and agriculture are heavily dependent on oil products.
Thus, South Africa heavily relies on oil imports. See STUDY COMMISSION, supra note 4, at
140.
120 S. CHEN, supra note 113, at 57.
121 See U.N. CHARTER arts. 24, 39, 40.
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or the "hidden veto" is that the dispute or situation is neither a threat to
nor a breach of the peace. Or alternatively, there are less drastic alterna-
tives to the proposed enforcment measure since the extremely disruptive
effect of the proposed enforcement on the competing interests outweighs
the effectiveness of the proposed action.
The Namibian crisis is clearly a "threat to the peace". 122 Therefore,
in order to justify any exercise of the "veto power" or the "hidden veto"
it should be required to show that: (1) there are competing interests (2)
the proposed enforcement measure of mandatory oil and trade sanctions
will have an extremely disruptive effect on these valid international inter-
ests; and (3) that there are less drastic alternatives to the proposed en-
forcement measure. Applying these three criteria to the Namibian dis-.
pute, the following conclusions can be made: The competing interests
involved in the imposition of mandatory oil and trade sanctions against
South Africa are the equitable right of the Namibian people to U.N. en-
forcement of their right to self-determination and independence, 23 and
the legal right of a sovereign independent state "to provide for its (eco-
nomic) prosperity; the imposition of the proposed oil embargo and trade
disinvestment would have a drastic, if not fatal, effect on the internal
economies of the United States, Great Britian, and other major investors
in South Africa as well as the economic order of the world community;
12 4
and there are less drastic alternatives to the imposition of mandatory oil
and trade disinvestment (such as implementing measures to improve
compliance with the 1977 arms embargo; adopting resolutions that call
upon member and non-member states to cease future investment in the
Union of South Africa; and calling upon member and non-member states
to support the negotiating efforts of such private groups as the Western
Contact Group). Given the above conclusions and the preceding discus-
sion, it is likely that the "veto power" or the "hidden veto" will continue
to block mandatory oil and trade sanctions against South Africa.
B. Effectiveness of U.N. Sanctions Against South Africa
The effectiveness of any U.N. sanction can only be accurately mea-
sured by the power of the sanction to remove the "threat to peace, breach
of the peace or act of aggression" that required the imposition of the
sanction, and to maintain or restore international peace and security. Ac-
cordingly, the 1977 U.N. mandatory arms embargo against South Africa
122 S.C. Res. 418, supra note 111.
123 This equitable right of the Namibian people is derived from the fact that they are
the beneficiaries under the South West Africa Mandate. The United Nations assumed the
position of trustee by adopting Resolution 2145. See note 82 supra. See also Convention on
Rights and Duties of States, 1933, 49 Stat. 3097, T.S. No. 881.
"I See note 119 and accompanying text supra.
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has been effective only to the extent it has secured South Africa's with-
drawal from Namibia, and has maintained international peace and secur-
ity in the region. The embargo's effectiveness in achieving the aforemen-
tioned objectives has, however, been minuscule. South Africa still
occupies Namibia in defiance of the International Court of Justice ruling
and in defiance of the U.N. Security Council's resolution declaring its
presence in Namibia illegal.'25 Therefore, an exploration of why the 1977
U.N. mandatory arms embargo against South Africa has been almost to-
tally ineffectual and what steps, if any, can be taken to increase its effec-
tiveness is critical.
There are several factors which contribute to the ineffectiveness of
U.N. mandatory economic sanctions. They are: timing or unreasonable
Delay of the Imposition of Sanctions, the non-self-executing Nature of
Sanctions, poor implementation of sanctions, and Internal Strengths of
the State under Sanction.1
26
1. Timing or Unreasonable Delay of the Imposition of Sanction
The U.N. Security Council imposed the 1977 mandatory arms em-
bargo six years after the United Nations first took cognizance of the crisis
in Namibia. 21 From the time the South African Government openly and
unilaterially denounced the decision of the International Court of Justice
in the Namibia case (1971), it was clear that South Africa intended to
persist in its breach of its international obligation to withdraw from
Namibia. Inevitably, the U.N. Security Council would find South Africa's
position a threat to and a breach of the peace, and therefore a probable
target for military sanctions under Chapter V, Article 41.128 Thus, from
the outset, the South African Government had six years to prepare itself
for any forthcoming Article 41 measure levied against it. This advantage,
compounded by the lengthy process of implementing the arms embargo
and by the lengthy delay of the ultimate effect of the arms embargo, 29
has allowed the South African Government time to accelerate its develop-
125 N.Y. Times, supra note 4; see note 107 and accompanying text supra.
26 Note, Economic Sanctions: An Effective Alternative To Military Coercion?, 6
BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 312-15 (Summer 1980). The structure and approach of the succeeding
analysis is derived from the preceding Note. Id.
12 Six years is comparable to the time it took the Security Council to "initiate a full
complement of mandatory economic sanctions against Rhodesia over 6 years after the
United Nations first took cognizance of the situation in Rhodesia." Note, supra note 161, at
312. Since the 1977 mandatory arms embargo is not a "full complement of mandatory eco-
nomic sanctions" against South Africa, it is reasonable to conclude that an even greater
legnth of time will lapse before a "full array of comprehensive mandatory sanctions" will be
levied against South Africa.
"0' Compare Note, supra 126, at 312.
129 For a similar advantage in Rhodesia see Note, supra note 126, at 312.
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ment and to diversify its arms production to attain self-sufficiency.1 30 For
example, South Africa in anticipation of Article 41 sanctions, achieved a
high degree of self-sufficiency in the manufacture of missile types, mine
clearing devices, ammunition types, bomb fuses, propellants and chemical
weapons to minimize its dependence of foreign sources, and to establish a
secondary arms market.131 The U.N. Security Council has "squandered
precious time."'3 2
2. Non Self-Executing Sanction and Implementation
Although the arms embargo levied by the Security Council was
mandatory, it was not self-executing.133 Thus, the actual legal obligation
that arises depends upon the enactment of municipal legislation by each
Member state.34 This means that there is piecemeal implementation of
the arms embargo. Further, the enforcement of the municipal legislation
is often ineffective and a poor determent to past and potential
violators."35
Violations of the governing municipal legislation by transnational
corporations have proven a perennial impediment to effective implemen-
tation of the arms embargo."38 The 1977 embargo called upon states "to
review ... all existing contractual arrangements with, and licenses
granted to, South Africa relating to the manfuacture and maintenance of
arms, ammunitation of all types and military equipment and vehicles,
with a view to terminating them."'' 7 Nevertheless, U.S. corporations, for
example, have provided artillery shells, GC 45 howitzer, and other arms
in flagrant violation of the U.S. State Department and the U.N em-
bargo."38 Thus, licenses and coproduction agreements continue to limit
embargo effectiveness."39
.SO Compare Note, supra note 126, at 312-13; STUDY COMMISSION, supra note 4, at 248.
131 STUDY COMMISSION, supra note 4, at 248-49.
"I Note, supra note 126, at 312.
3 L. GOODRICH & E. HAMBRO, CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS, COMMENTARY AND
DOCUMENTS 278 (1949).
134 Id.
135 Compare the "sporadic and unenthusiastic" implementation of S.C. mandatory
sanctions against Rhodesia. Note, supra note 126, at 313.
Note, supra note 126, at 314.
"s S.C. Res. 418, supra note 144.
"s Jackson, supra note 4, at 10; British, German, Italian, French and Israeli transna-
tional companies have also been reported has engaging in post arms embargo sales of jet
engines and avionics, marine diesel engines, components and spares for aircraft and missle
components and electronic technology respectively. STUDY COMMISSION, supra note 4, at 249.
"I Although there is no available figure on the number of preembargo licenses and
coproduction agreements, it is estimated that there is at least several hundred. Moreover,
there is no evidence that a substantial number of these agreements have been unilaterally
severed by the supplying party in accordance with the mandatory arms embargo since in
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3. South Africa's Internal Strengths
Despite the 1977 arms embargo, South Africa remains one of the
strongest military powers in Africa. As an example, in August 1977 and
September 1979, there were reports that South Africa was planning or
actually performed muclear weapons testing.
40
South Africa also has strong commercial "partners".' 4 ' For example,
the United States is South Africa's major supplier of mainframe com-
puters such that 45% of the market over the past three years has grown
from $100 million to $254 million in 1980.14 2 The available data 143 sug-
gests that the effectiveness of the 1977 mandatory arms embargo can be
increased if it is enforced by Member and Non-Member states, and if
South Africa is militarily and economically weakened.14
IV. OVERVMW
A. U.N. Economic Sanctions
The preceding analysis reveals that the U.N. 1977 mandatory arms
embargo has been ineffective in coercing South Africa's compliance with
the decision of the International Court of Justice in the Namibia case.
Further, the key measures necessary to increase the effectiveness of the
arms embargo are not being universally enforced by Member and Non-
Member states. It was also shown that the U.N. Security Council will
probably not adopt mandatory oil or trade disinvestment restraints as ec-
onomic sanctions against South Africa. The United Nations only re-
course, the 1977 mandatory arms embargo, is at most "buying time" to
prevent the Namibian freedom fighters (SWAPO) and interested African
states from resorting to full scale military aggression. But time is running
out.
B. Recommendations: The U.S. Role in the Quasi-Meditorial Contact
Group
Given the present inadequacies of the U.N. mandatory arms em-
some cases, a unilateral breach would only initiate South African production and stop "the
flow of income from South Africa to the firm." Cf. STUDY COMMISSION, supra note 4, at 251.
110 See, e.g., G.A. Res. 34193, 46 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 25) at 31, U.N. Doc. A/34/46
(1979).
141 Compare "commercial allies" in Note, supra note 126, at 316. See also, note 99 and
accompanying text supra.
42 The total South African market is $650 million when peripheral ahd software is
included. Business Week, Oct. 5, 1981, at 46.
141 S.C. Res. 134 (adopted 856th mts.) at 1, U.N. Doc. S/4300 (1960); Cf. STUDY COM-
MISSION, supra note 4, at 411.
4 See, e.g., note 104 and accompanying text, supra.
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bargo, one alternative vehicle to expedite peaceful independence for
Namibia is the Western Contact Group. The negotiations between the
Contact Group and the African parties to the dispute have fluctuated be-
cause of the African parties' acute distrust of the United States commit-
ment to Namibian self-government. The United States is in a position to
determine the success of the Contact Group. Whether the United States
can persuade the African parties that, irrespective of its commercial rela-
tions with the Union of South Africa, it is unbiased, is a key issue. In view
of the delicate task the United States has endeavored to accomplish, the
following recommendations are advanced: 1) Clarify the U.S. Govern-
ment's fundamental and continuing opposition apartheid by confirming
Security Council Resolution 134, which resolves that the policy of
apartheid constitutes a serious distrub of international peace. This is crit-
ical because U.S. investment in South Africa, including that of American
corporations, is strongly viewed by the African parties as an accomplice to
the system of apartheid; 2) Assist in the economic development of the
other African states in southern Africa in order to reduce the imbalance
in U.S. economic relations with South Africa and to confirm the United
States commitment to "international cooperation in solving international
problems of an economic and social character.' 1 45 The United States will
thereby appear less partial to Black Africa; 3) Encourage other states par-
ticularly other members of the quasi-mediatorial Contact Group, to adopt
similar policies since the credibility of the Contact group is doubted by
the African parties for many of the same reasons; 4) Provide the African
parties with sound legal grounds for exercising the "veto power" or the
"hidden veto"; and 5) Adopt legislation to increase surveillance of the
arms embargo" 6e and to encourage U.S. corporations to support Black ec-
" See STUDY COMMISSION supra note 4, at 444; U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 3. Zimbabwe
is a prime example of a southern African state where investment is not only feasible, but
potentially lucrative. It has been stated that "the expending opportunities in exportation
and import substitution brought about by the international recognition of Zimbabwe in the
areas of foreign aid and trade relations have been and should continue to be vigorously
pursued." Note, Minimum Wage Legislation in Developing Countries Zimbabwe: A Case in
Point, 13 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 402 (1981). Moreover, BUSINESS WEEK predicted that
Zimbabwe's GNP, which grew by 6% in 1980, would continue to expand, and that Salisbury
is the region's logical business hub. BUSINESS WEEK, Feb. 16, 1981, at 46.
148 U.S. regulations for implementing the 1977 mandatory arms embargo do not pro-
hibit sales to South Africa of arms and weapons-related technology originating in other
countries. Thus, subsidiaries of U.S. transnational corporations that are incorporated in a
foreign state may sell embargoed items to the South African government if not prohibited
by the law of the state of incorporation or principal place of business. Although the United
States must respect the sovereign right of a state to regulate the conduct of corporations
incorporated or nationalized by its laws and operating within its boundaries, it should also
recognize that the legal and economic interests involved in the Namibian dispute warrant
effective implementation of the arms embargo by extending U.S. law to regulate the actions
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onomic and social development through investment and loans. 147
V. CONCLUSION
The struggle between the United Nations and South Africa regarding
Namibia's self-determination and independence has continued for more
than a quarter of a century. Namibia is now "able to stand by itself", and
thus the time has arrive for the "sacred trust of civilization" to terminate.
By assuming direct responsibility for the Namibia, the United Nations is
obligated under international law to procure the right of Namibia to self-
determination and independence. Despite U.N. efforts to enforce
Namibia's rights, however, the Government of South Africa continues to
occupy Namibia in violation of international law.
The only remaining means to effectuate Namibia's right to indepen-
dence peacefully is the Western Contact Group. Presently, however, that
body is struggling to achieve its function of presenting a plan that is ac-
ceptably impartial to the African parties. The United States plays an im-
portant role in determining whether this problem is remedied. If the Con-
tact Group fails to achieve its goal, it is probable that there will be
military confrontation between the African parties and South Africa.
Such a war would seriously disrupt any U.S. economic interest in the re-
gion and cast doubt on the United Nations ability to maintain interna-
tional peace and security. In view of this real possibility, the United
States should strengthen its role as a quasi-mediator in the Namibian
crisis.
of foreign subsidaries of U.S. transnational corporations. Cf. STUDY COMMISSION, supra note
4, at 414.
147 Cf. STUDY COMMISSION, supra note 4, at 454.
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